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L
et’s say a stranger
comes to you and
wants to borrow a sig-
nificant amount of money. If
you’re reasonable, you’ll sit
back and assess the interest
rate that you may charge, the
time you’ll let the loan go
before repayment, and then
you’ll think about the chance
that the stranger won’t repay
the loan. You may be
extremely careful in deter-
mining whether the risk of
not being repaid is worth the
benefit of some additional
interest in the future. Now
imagine that the money you
are considering lending is
money that you yourself have
borrowed from a second
stranger. How will your deci-
sion be affected?
You may be a little less
concerned if you are loaning
out someone else’s money. If
your loan is repaid, then you
keep the interest and pay
back your own creditor. If the
loan fails, you go tell your creditor you’ve lost the money. You
keep the money if you win, and leave someone else with the
bill if you lose. This situation is an example of what econo-
mists call moral hazard: You have incentives to take risks
because you can pass the bill if things don’t go your way.
Borrowing from and lending to strangers is what banks
do every day. Depositors lend banks their money by placing
it in savings and checking accounts, and banks put all of
their deposits together and then make loans to individuals or
businesses that are looking for extra cash. And since bank
deposits are generally guaranteed up to $100,000 by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) — meaning
that depositors don’t think about bank risk because they’ll
get their money back — banks can have an incentive to favor
high-risk, high-reward loans. 
One of the roles of the
Federal Reserve System is to
regulate banks and ensure
they are behaving in a manner
that is not too risky. The Fed
shares this duty with several
other institutions at both 
the federal and state level.
These regulators have a
responsibility to the public 
of preventing banks from
making overly risky loans
because of moral hazard, 
protecting the money of
depositors, and encouraging
banks to only make loans for
projects that have a high
probability of success. 
The cost to society of hav-
ing risky banks fail because
of bad loans is potentially
very high. During the 1980s,
for example, savings and 
loan banks, burdened with
loan portfolios ruined by
high inflation, turned to
making excessively risky
loans, attempting to recover.
Many of these risky loans
backfired, and the result was a massive number of failures
and large government bailouts.
In a perfect world, regulators would be able to easily
monitor banks’ loan portfolios, somehow understanding
the risk of each and every loan and therefore the risk of the
entire portfolio. Reality, however, is more complicated.
Occasionally, a bank may have some unexpected shock to
its portfolio — such as a sudden change in the risk of a loan
— and the bank knows about the shock but the regulator
does not. This discrepancy in information between regula-
tors and banks is an example of what economists call
hidden information.
For an external inspector like the Fed, monitoring 
hidden information and managing moral hazard is of 
central importance. Research by economists at Federal
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at various ways regulators can handle
hidden information and try to control
moral hazard has led to consensus on
broad issues, but occasional disagree-
ment over details. Ned Prescott, an
economist at the Richmond Fed, has
two proposals to manage these two
problems. First, he advocates giving
banks limited choices as to how they
are regulated, with the idea they will
self-select options that help regulators
monitor hidden information. Second,
he argues for close examination of
high returns as a way of managing
moral hazard.
AWide Degree of Uncertainty
The economics literature differs 
in the details regarding prescriptions
for regulating banks. In practice, 
regulation relies heavily on capital
requirements, which limit the amount
of leverage, or deposit financing, a
bank can engage in.
So what is the optimal capital struc-
ture for banks? Economists do not
agree on any one theory of capital
structure for general firms. When con-
sidering a specific industry such as
banking, the disagreement grows.
With regard to general firms, a cele-
brated paper by Nobel Laureates
Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller
from the 1950s, “The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance, and the Theory
of Investment,” argued that in a perfect
economy, a firm’s capital structure did
not matter. They found that invest-
ments funded by borrowing or equity
were equivalent because firm value
depended only on the future stream of
income from the investment, not on
how the firm financed the investment. 
In showing what did not matter,
Modigliani and Miller helped point
financial economists toward what 
did matter — departures from the
model’s perfect economy. A variety of
departures such as taxes, bankruptcy
costs, and agency costs have been
developed. 
One specific departure from
Modigliani and Miller, and one 
considered highly relevant for bank
regulation, is the work of Michael
Jensen and William Meckling, who use
contract theory to discuss firm behav-
ior. In their 1976 paper “Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure,” they
identified the equity owners as the
decisionmakers of firms. The managers
of banks would, they concluded, act in
the best interests of the equity owners
of the firm and not necessarily the debt
holders. Specifically, the equity holders
only care about the positive side of the
risk — they hope to make a profit on
their investment and do not care if the
bank loses the debt holders’ money.
Equity holders, though, do care
about losing their own money, so the
way to control risk-taking incentives 
is to keep debt financing down. This 
is the logic behind capital require-
ments. Banks are highly leveraged
firms — a large part of their funding
comes from deposits, which are essen-
tially a form of debt financing. The
greater a bank’s capital — its equity as a
fraction of assets — the more equity
holders have to lose.
In recent decades, globalization has
put banks from different countries in
competition with one another, so the
financial community must strive for
not only ideal capital regulation in the
United States, but also ideal capital
regulation in the entire world.
With this push toward global bank-
ing competition in mind, the United
States entered into the international
Basel Accord in 1988, which set gener-
al standards for capital regulation of
banks in all agreeing countries. The
standards set by Basel I, however, were
fairly primitive, as capital require-
ments only depended on the types of
assets a bank held. Each bank, with lit-
tle regard to its loan portfolio’s risk,
had a set percentage of its assets that it
had to hold as equity. The assessed risk
on each loan in a bank’s portfolio
depended on broadly based categories
— such as commercial versus govern-
ment loans — that generally told little
about the risk of each loan.
The deficiencies of the Basel
Accord led to a follow-up agreement,
Basel II, which is currently under 
consideration in the United States. 
Basel II is designed to change capital
regulation mainly for large, interna-
tionally active banks. The new
standards focus on three broad pillars:
identifying and controlling risk,
supervisory review, and market super-
vision. More sophisticated than that
of Basel I, the capital regulation of
Basel II relies heavily on a bank’s self-
assessment. Using their internal
models of risk, each bank will report
to the regulator their estimates of sev-
eral figures, including risk and losses
given default, for each loan. This
assessment then determines the capi-
tal requirements that the bank has to
meet given its overall risk.
The issue of regulation therefore
returns to one of hidden information
between the regulator and the bank.
Even if the regulator has some infor-
mation, the bank will always have
more. What then has Basel II solved?
In order for the system to work as
planned, incentives must be provided
to make banks report risk accurately.
Clearly, nobody understands a bank’s
risk better than the bank, so self-
assessment will be better than
anything an outsider could produce. 
New Proposals from a 
Fed Economist
Ned Prescott, an economist in the
field of banking regulation theory at
the Richmond Fed, advocates several
novel approaches to regulating banks
under Basel II. After doing his disser-
tation at the University of Chicago on
contract theory and sharecroppers in
less developed countries, Prescott
looked for other ways to use the wide-
ly applicable tools of contract theory. 
He turned to researching bank 
regulation, a change that came natural-
ly, he notes, because “contract theory
models were well designed to address
bank regulation issues.” Specifically,
contract theory, originally developed 
to handle insurance problems created
by moral hazard and hidden inform-
ation, could look at deposit insurance in
the banking industry. “A lot of bank 
regulation deals with perverse incen-
tives caused by deposit insurance, so
contract theory is a natural fit for study-
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Prescott’s research agenda fits
nicely with critical elements of Basel
II. He sees the new accord as a 
step forward in bank regulation, but
only if implemented properly. To 
be successful, it must address banks’
incentives to conceal private infor-
mation about risk. “What incentive
does a bank have to report the true 
risks of its assets?” he asks. “Without
adequate supervision and appropriate
penalties, the answer is, ‘Not much.’”
With this need for supervision in
mind, Prescott focuses his research on
ways bank regulators can manage the
problems of moral hazard and hidden
information. Traditionally, regulators
use inspections and sanctions to
ensure that banks meet capital
requirements. Using these traditional
tools in flexible ways, Prescott finds,
can lead to a more efficient bank regu-
lation structure and better results
from the banking sector.
But how does the regulator achieve
this efficient structure and ensure that
banks follow the rules when it cannot
perfectly monitor banks? In other
words, since regulators have limited
resources, what is the best way to allo-
cate those resources in regulating
banks? Prescott’s theories challenge
the traditional way that banking regu-
lation is performed. He feels that his
proposals to discourage banks’ risk-
taking are cost efficient and will not
inhibit the actions of safe banks. 
Prescott thinks one way to regulate
banks easily is by giving banks choices
from a menu of capital requirements
and inspection intensity. Banks that
look similar from the outside might
face a trade-off along the following
lines: the higher the capital require-
ment, the less intense the inspection.
The striking result, Prescott says, is
that regulators will end up inspecting
the relatively safe banks that have
lower capital requirements.
Isn’t this counterintuitive?
Shouldn’t regulators inspect risky
banks, not safe ones? Not exactly, says
Prescott, noting, “The reason for this
seemingly counterintuitive result is
that inspections prevent risky banks
from declaring that they are safe
banks.” Banks wish to avoid penalties,
which they incur if inspections find
that they did not hold enough capital
for their risks. Banks that do not want
to be penalized during inspections
will accept tougher capital regula-
tions; banks that wish to have eased
capital restriction accept the possibil-
ity of getting an inspection. 
The reason the regulator doesn’t
inspect risky banks is that those
banks have admitted to being risky by
accepting higher capital require-
ments. “[With proper penalties] no
one wants to claim to be riskier than
they actually are, [so] inspecting a
bank that claims it is the highest risk
is unnecessary,” Prescott asserts.
“This bank has agreed to hold more
capital, and that is all the regulators
desire.” In the end, banks are not 
hiding any information, as they self-
report the right amount of capital
they should hold.
The advantage of this capital
requirement and inspecting struc-
ture is that banks choose their own
capital level from several options in a
way that reveals their true risk level.
Prescott’s ideas for a menu of con-
tracts extend from the original
“precommitment approach,” advo-
cated by Paul Kupiec and James
O’Brien of the Fed’s Board of
Governors. Under the precommit-
ment approach, banks would set
their own capital requirements,
much like under Basel II, and then
incur fines if they ended up not hold-
ing enough to cover any losses they
received. This basic self-selection
extends to a menu of contracts by
offering specific options rather than
letting banks set arbitrary capital
levels.
Free to Choose
This idea of using a menu of con-
tracts is not relevant only to
banking regulation — insurance
companies use it all the time. For
example, most auto insurers let you
choose your coverage from several
packages. You assess your risk, and
choose a package with deductibles,
coverage, and payments that fit
your risk most appropriately. Since the
situation is similar in banking, it makes
sense for the regulators of banks to give 
similar options to the banks under
their supervision.
Prescott’s personal experience con-
tains another example of a menu of
contracts in regulatory environments.
He recalls a trip to Mexico, where each
individual going through customs had
to choose a line: green or red. People
in the green line had a low probability
of being searched, but violations car-
ried hefty fines. Those in the red line
were automatically searched, but
lower fines accompanied violations.
Since officials clearly stated the nature
of each line, travelers could choose the
option that fit them best. In a similar
manner, Prescott believes, banks
should be able to choose from a menu
the option that fits best.
Despite the political or legal barri-
ers, Prescott points to practices that
mimic the menu of contracts approach.
“Some practices use menus of contracts
implicitly,” he says. For example, the
internal models approach to banking
regulation — presently used for a por-
tion of a bank’s portfolio — requires
banks to estimate their own value-at-
risk, which is a statistic estimating
potential losses. Based upon this statis-
tic, banks must set a certain level of
capital. Since their internal models
determine their capital requirement,
banks can alter those internal models to
yield preferred results. Specifically, a
bank can make its estimates risky or
safe in order to influence the exact
amount of its capital requirement. But
the bank is penalized if losses on the
portfolio exceed the capital they hold.
Prescott also studies the presence of
moral hazard, which encourages banks
to make risky loans, particularly when
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economic condition. Over time, banks
that submit to this temptation will typ-
ically have more variation in their
returns than those banks that have rela-
tively safe and steady loan portfolios.
Risky banks understand that some of
their loans have a significant chance of
failing, but hope to reap significant
gains from those which are repaid.
The savings and loan banks of the
1980s provide a good example as to
what happens when banks gamble. The
inflation of the early 1980s significantly
decreased the values of loan portfolios
of many of these savings and loan
banks, putting them on the path to
financial ruin. In an attempt to break
even, these banks made more and more
risky loans, hoping that having a few
succeed would bring in enough profit to
keep the bank alive. If these risky loans
did not pay off, the bank would still be
insolvent, or no worse off than before
making the loans.
This strategy of “gambling for res-
urrection” stands in contrast to sound
banks, which did not need to make the
extremely risky loans to stay afloat.
These safer banks could continue
making lower-risk, “safe and prudent”
loans because they did not face a finan-
cial crisis. 
Banks that make unusually high
returns, therefore, may be in financial
trouble and gambling for resurrection.
The risky gambling may pay off and 
produce high returns, but sends a clear 
signal that a bank is excessively risky.
One way to discourage this risk,
Prescott argues, is to use regulatory con-
tracts that include fines when banks
generate extremely high returns,
because it discourages high risk-taking
strategies.
In “Bank Capital Regulation with
and without State-Contingent
Penalties,” with co-author David
Marshall of the Chicago Fed, Prescott
admits, “the particular form taken by
the optimal fine schedule is somewhat
unusual.” In a subsequent paper “State-
Contingent Bank Regulation with
Unobserved Actions and Unobserved
Characteristics,” the same authors
admit that the contracts that they advo-
cate “often require fines on high returns,
an approach that could encounter polit-
ical and even legal obstacles.”  
Others have raised concerns as
well. John Boyd of the University of
Minnesota, in published comments on
Prescott and Marshall’s work, worries
about the proposed fines’ effects on
innovation. He notes, “It would be
extremely difficult for regulators to
distinguish between large profits due
to risk-seeking and those due to finan-
cial innovation.” Pointing to several
risky innovations in the 1990s that
turned out to be successful, he worries,
“there would be social costs to any tax
scheme which penalized such mar-
velous innovations.”  
Responding to the criticisms that
their proposed fine system would face
implementation barriers and stymie
innovation, Prescott and Marshall
suggest using inspections rather than
fines. That is, instead of fining banks
that produce extra-high returns, 
regulators could trigger inspections 
to determine if the returns resulted
from financial innovation or inappro-
priate risk. In this way, the high
returns act as a sort of “red flag” signal
to regulators.
These banking regulation propos-
als would help reduce the risk that
banks take, a good result for society.
Risky banks that fail can lead to large
payments from the FDIC to deposi-
tors, which costs the government
money. In addition, risky banks make
loans to businesses or individuals that
are not deserving of the loan because
of low probability of repayment. In
other words, risky banks help fund
inefficient projects. The loans made
to the undeserving groups could be
made to companies or people with
better plans for using the funds. 
Prescott hopes to expand his
research in the future to consider the
third pillar of Basel II, which focuses
on market supervision. He is looking
into how regulators can use market
data to help create better regulatory
environments, allowing banks to 
do business while encouraging safe
practices. RF
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